Play as a form of philosophical experience

Adam Lalak[1]

Abstract: For philosophical practice to be transformative, it should go beyond the intellect and connect to the experiential level. However, engaging in philosophy also requires one to take a certain amount of distance from experience. This article argues that play offers experiences particularly suited to philosophical reflection. Drawing upon Bøyum's analysis of philosophical experiences and Fink's analysis of play, it argues that philosophy practitioners would be wise to use play in their work. Different kinds of play - agon, alea, mimicry and illinx - are considered in the light of their potential for delivering different forms of philosophical insight.

Key-words: philosophical practice; play; experience; experiential education;

Introduction

The aim of this article is to address an apparent tension between the following two ideas:
1. Philosophical practice should be experiential.
2. Philosophising requires a certain amount of distance from experience.

[1]Ludwig-Maximilians Universitat, Munich, Germany, Email: adam.lalak@ff.cuni.cz

Both of these ideas will be defended in the article, although their acceptability depends on value-laden assumptions about the purpose of philosophical practice. This being said, this tension might be regarded as an urgent challenge by those who seek to make philosophical practice transformative on a personal level for their clients without losing its philosophical foundation. Such people might read the present article with interest. As a response to the tension between the aforementioned claims, the present article proposes the idea of play. Specifically, it argues that engaging in play can be immensely valuable for philosophical practice. Such a view might come as counterintuitive to those who consider philosophical practice a deeply serious business. After all, play has traditionally been seen as little more than a form of respite from serious matters.[1] I do not dispute that there exists an ontological abyss between real life and play. However, the same is true of the relationship between real life and philosophy. I argue that, in fact, play can be seen as a paradigmatically philosophical activity. The paper consists of two parts. In the first one, I outline an argument for treating play as a potential source of philosophical experiences. Drawing upon the ideas of theorists like Bøyum and Fink, I suggest that philosophy practitioners in particular would be wise to use play as a part of their work. In the second part, I describe a few types of games I have used in my own practice and offer some considerations on the significance of each. I conclude with a few thoughts on the parallels between play and philosophy.

1. Experience

Philosophical questions and insights often emerge out of unusual experiences. Experiences such as giving birth or losing a loved one tend to disrupt our usual patterns of thinking, and thus prompt us to seek new concepts and ideas to make sense of them. Sometimes, this can be a relatively quick and painless process. But other times, they force us to reevaluate our most fundamental assumptions and engage in a process of conceptual scrutiny that is profoundly philosophical. Generally speaking, the deeper our experience is, the more philosophical our search becomes.

Drawing upon an analogy with religious experience, Bøyum (2008) introduces the concept of *philosophical experience* to describe a special class of experiences characterised by their ability to deliver philosophical

insight. Such experiences often seemingly unconceal a new dimension of reality or teach us a new way to look at the world. As an example, Bøyum follows Stanley Cavell in suggesting that skepticism originates in the sense of "being sealed off from the world, enclosed within [our] own endless succession of experiences" (Cavell 1979, quoted by Bøyum 2008). Bøyum is not the only one to note the connection between experience and philosophy. A number of historians of philosophy have noted the role of romantic, mystical or tragic experiences in the development of influential philosophical thoughts. For example, Stace (1960) considers Hegel's concept of "the identity of opposites" to be a "transcription" of a peculiar mystical experience. Although such experiences would undoubtedly enrich philosophical practice, they are not essential. Collective inquiry can easily take place outside of experiential contexts. For instance, many wonderful exercises developed by philosophy practitioners involve drawing distinctions and conducting analyses of well-defined problems that require reason alone.[3] However, one may wonder whether philosophical practice can be truly transformative without an experiential dimension. Reaching a rational conclusion is no guarantee of the transformation of the self. For example, many people agree with the philosophical arguments for vegetarianism without actually becoming vegetarian, and many people agree that their anxiety is irrational yet continue to experience it. As elegantly summarised by Irvin Yalom:

> Here is a truth with a supreme and irrefutable rationality. However, when I'm truly frightened, it never works, it never calms my fears. This is the problem in Philosophy: to teach Philosophy and to apply it to real life are very different enterprises (Yalom, 2007; quoted by: Barrientos-Rastrojo 2015, p. 285).

Should philosophical practice aim at the transformation of the self? There is certainly no simple answer to this question. A case for an affirmative answer could draw upon the oft-made claim that philosophical practice can be understood as an heir to ancient Greek philosophical schools such as Platonism, Stoicism and Epicureanism (Hansen-Helskog 2019, Amir 2018). These schools arguably took individual transformation to be their chief concern (Hadot 2004). Even today, many people turn to philosophy in the hope that it will help them to live better, not just to

improve their reasoning skills. Philosophical practice is more satisfying when it changes *people*, not just their *ideas*. In the light of these considerations, several authors have complained about what they perceive to be an analytic bias within contemporary philosophical practice, and argued that philosophical practice needs to become more experiential. They have used different concepts to describe the holistic impact of such a practice. Lahav (2021) talks about "adding additional dimensions to our inner life"; Barrientos-Rastrojo (2015) refers to "an ontological transformation that involves all the dimensions of our being; Almeida (2023) describes the process of "awakening one's humanity" through experience. All such expressions are united by a shared concern for going beyond the "merely intellectual". Barrientos-Rastrojo (2015) defines *experiential philosophical practice* as a process of generation and tracking of [a person's] direct or indirect experiences. This process includes stirring up attitudes or dispositions that turn lived activities ('vivencias') in experiences (p. 297). Barrientos-Rastrojo uses the examples of deep solitude or "listening to the rhythm of reality" to show which experiences which can be used in experiential philosophical practice. The important thing about such an approach to philosophical practice is that people do not philosophise in a vacuum but in a proximal connection to their experience. Their experience not only helps them illustrate some of their claims but directly shapes the words that come out of their mouth. They philosophise not *about* experience but *from* experience. Lahav (2021) in this context talks about "philosophising from our inner depth".

2. Distance

It is often said that the philosophical state of the mind requires us to take a distance. Only in this way can we contemplate life with clarity and cool-headedness. What are we supposed to take distance from? Perhaps from our subjectivity or from our experience. While immersed in our life, we often lose ourselves in it and find ourselves unable to reflect upon it clearly. It is therefore important to transcend this immersion and develop a detached, philosophical perspective. This point has been elaborated with special clarity by the phenomenological tradition inspired by Edmund Husserl. According to Husserl, philosophising requires one to suspend one's "natural attitude" towards the world (Sokolowski 1999).

The natural attitude is the spontaneous, default attitude that we use in our everyday life as we have conversations with friends, go for walks or apply for jobs. In such an attitude, we simply accept the world as it is given to us. To conduct a philosophical investigation, one needs to disengage from this attitude and assume a special reflective standpoint which allows one to observe and analyse in a more neutral and unbiased way. This is what phenomenologists call the phenomenological attitude.

> When we move into the phenomenological attitude, we become something like detached observers of the passing scene or like spectators at a game. We become onlookers. We contemplate the involvements we have with the world and with things in it, and we contemplate the world in its human involvement. We are no longer simply participants in the world; we contemplate what it means to be a participant in the world and in manifestations (Sokolowski 1999, p. 48).

Although the phenomenological method is only one of many approaches to philosophising, the sentiment described above is by no means unique to it. Starting from Plato's allegory of the cave, many have argued that the philosophising individual needs to transcend the everyday world of experience and assume a broader (or higher) perspective. This cannot be done while we are engaged in our life. With a characteristically exaggerated tone, the well-known philosophy practitioner Oscar Brenifier (2009) writes that to "to philosophise is to cease living". Life, according to Brenifier, is characterised by desire, and desire is the greatest enemy to philosophy. To philosophise, we therefore need to suspend life itself.

This point has a philosophical and a psychological component. Philosophically speaking, our experience always presents the world to us from a specific perspective, and this biases our thinking. Philosophy always aspires towards something general or universal, and therefore it needs to transcend subjective experience. I propose to employ the concept of trans-subjectivity (Ginev et al. 2020) to denote this quality of philosophical thought. But there is also a more down-to-earth, psychological point to be made. Experience sometimes makes us emotional and agitated, which prevents us from thinking clearly. Think of highly traumatising experiences such as surviving a natural disaster.

While such experiences can shatter our philosophical worldview, they are often too stressful for individuals to fully integrate them into an insight. Within the field of philosophical practice, this point has been especially emphasised by philosophers working in the neo-Socratic tradition inaugurated by Leonard Nelson. While this tradition has made experience central to their dialogical practice, they also put a lot of emphasis on the "emotional closeness" of such experience (Altorf 2016). In their opinion, a philosophical investigation must not "concern a situation in which the example-giver is still emotionally involved", because this would make the goal conversation therapeutic, not philosophical (Altorf 2016, p. 66). While I doubt that a strict distinction between therapy and philosophical practice can be maintained, the observation that emotions can interfere with philosophical reasoning is an apt one. A certain degree of emotional closeness is desirable when engaging in philosophy.

3. Play

So far, I have argued that:
1. To preserve the transformational potential of philosophy, we ought to think *from* experience. Therefore, philosophical practice should work directly with experience.
2. To think clearly, one must not be consumed by one's experience. Therefore, philosophical practice should maintain a distance from experience.

It is not hard to spot a tension between these two claims. It would almost appear that we're faced with an irresolvable dilemma. On the one hand, we can make philosophical practice lively and proximal to experience, but sacrifice the ancient aspiration to objectivity and impartial reason. Such practice may succeed in being personal and deep, but runs the risk of getting closer to poetry or mysticism than to philosophy. On the other hand, we can make philosophical practice *cool, calm and collected*, but give up on the ancient aspiration to transformation of the self. Such philosophical practice will satisfy our desire for intellectual insight, but might end up leaving the way we live untouched. This dilemma indeed presents a serious challenge for philosophical practice. How can we develop a practice that is both experiential and trans-subjective? How can we be both close to and distant from experience?

In the following paragraphs, I offer one solution to this dilemma, which consists in treating *play* as a kind of philosophical experience. I propose that play is a highly useful tool for philosophical practice because it is both similar to and distinct from real life. As such, it can both mediate powerful philosophical experiences and allow us to maintain a required distance from them.

Let us start with some considerations as to why play might mediate philosophical experiences. Play is a peculiar activity which disrupts the way we normally experience the world. In play, ordinary meanings are reconfigured: objects acquire new roles, relationships shift, and everyday norms are temporarily suspended. At its most extreme, play allows us to engage in activities that we, civilised people, would normally avoid. Think of play fighting, in which we use violence against people we barely know; think of historical enactment, in which we act as if we are ancient Greeks bringing offerings to Zeus; think of sexual play, in which we use vulgar swearwords to address the people we love. Although such experiences can seem like innocent pastimes, they can touch us on profound levels. Even a simple chess victory can transform self-perception, while role-play may evoke emotions comparable to real-life love. It is important to see that such experiences of play are not self-enclosed; they open us to reality in novel ways. The phenomenologist Eugen Fink (2010/1960) describes this quality of play as *ecstatic*, because it allows us to step outside of ourselves and unconceal new, hidden dimensions of reality.

> While playing, the human being does not remain in himself, does not remain in an enclosed domain of his psychic interiority—rather, he ecstatically steps out of and beyond himself in a cosmic gesture and interprets the whole of the world in a manner that is suffused with sense (Fink 2010/1960, p. 46).

This description resembles what has been said about Bøyum's (2008) notion of philosophical experiences. Play can be a philosophical experience precisely because in its reconfiguration of meanings, it allows us to grasp neglected dimensions of reality and receive novel philosophical insights. However, while experiences involved in play are very much real, they also maintain a kind of distance from what we usually refer to as real life. In everyday parlance, playfulness is often contrasted with seriousness.

When we accuse someone of playing games, we often mean that they are avoiding responsibility or refusing to "get real". This is because playfulness is often characterised by an "as if" attitude: it asks of us to detach ourselves from the way things *really* are and engage in a form of pretense (Csepregi 2022). In an earlier essay, Eugen Fink (2010/1957) argues that play differs from the rest of life in its inconsequentiality. Most life activities are characterised by constant worries about the future consequences of our actions. What if I miss my income when I quit my job? What if I feel guilty when I cheat on my partner? Play provides us a welcome break from such worries, because it (normally) does not have an impact on the normal course of our life.

> When we play, we are released for a while from the hustle and bustle of life—as though transported to another planet where life seems lighter, more buoyant, easier. (...) Play "interrupts" the continuity and context of our course of life that is determined by an ultimate purpose. It withdraws in a peculiar manner from the other ways of directing one's life; it is at a distance from them (Fink 2010/1957, pp. 20-21).

Even when emotions run high, players typically sustain a reflective distance; competitive outcomes rarely disrupt real-life relationships. The playful attitude appears to be a special kind of mental state that allows players to be involved on one level and maintain a clear mind on another. I think that this is precisely what is needed for them to engage in responsible philosophising. The fact that they are in a game means that they do not get overwhelmed by what is happening and maintain the ability to reflect. To conclude, play provides us with a model for what experiential philosophical practice can look like. Deep play can provide us with experiences that satisfy Bøyum's criteria for being philosophical, in that they shake our reality and thus provide us with material for real philosophical insight. At the same time, it is sufficiently removed from real life not to be all-consuming and to allow us the required space for trans-subjective reflection. Philosophy practitioners interested in experiential approaches should thus seriously consider how different kinds of games and play can help them raise different kinds of philosophical questions and engage their clients in different kinds of *ontological transformation*.

4. Examples

In this section, I provide some examples of games that can, in my opinion, mediate interesting philosophical experiences to participants and discuss how they can be used to raise specific philosophical issues. I employ an influential taxonomy of games developed by Caillois (1961). This taxonomy nicely illustrates the diversity of forms of play and the attached metaphysical realities that these forms of play put us in touch with.

a) Agon

The first type of games to be considered is known under the Greek word of *agon*. Caillois (1961) uses this term to classify competitive games such as football, wrestling or chess. In such games, people compete against one another or against themselves in one particular domain (speed, strength, memory…). This domain typically contains an element of merit: you can improve your strength or your memory by training. A key feature of games of agon is that they always take place in artificially created conditions. This is a mechanism for creating a form of equality where there is naturally none.

Agon highlights the confrontational and competitive dimensions of life. When people engage in games of agon, they often spontaneously exclaim things like: "that is not fair!" This is because agonic games naturally confront us with the philosophical problem of justice.[7] Agon games can be viewed as miniature laboratories of fairness. Think of the practice of handicapping in sports, for instance, which tries to equalise the chances of winning by assigning players differential advantages. Fairness is within the interest of all players, because the concepts of winning would stop making sense if the game was not perceived as fair by everyone involved. But when do factors stop being considered fair? Where do we draw the boundaries, e.g. in creating brackets for age categories in sport? This naturally draws us to wonder about the arbitrariness of justice. The problem of justice has been considered a central philosophical issue at least since Plato, and games of agon are a perfect portal to discussing it. Engaging in games of agon brings this dimension of human existence especially vivid to us. Let me illustrate this with a concrete example: *chess-wrestling*. This is a game that a colleague of mine invented for the purpose

of making the attendees of our philosophical workshop reflect on the topic of fairness. In this game, participants would compete against each other by first playing chess for three minutes and then wrestle for another three minutes. We introduced the game in the form of a tournament, in which every participant was randomly paired up with an opponent, regardless of gender and age. Naturally, many situations in this game were perceived as "not fair". Since the participants were actively "in" the game, this was not only a theoretical matter for them but a lived concern, leading them to engage in spontaneous discussions about fairness. In a later part of the workshop, we engaged in a facilitated philosophical dialogue about whether competitions can ever be fair and what fairness is in the first place. The peculiar experiential-philosophical structure *that* can be addressed through a particular philosophical inquiry. More specifically, such games emphasise the separation of individuals and focus on their confrontational relations. As a result, it can lead to insights about justice that can be transformational.

b) Alea

Games described as *alea* by Caillois operate with the idea of chance or good fortune. They are most famously typified by gambling games, such as dice, roulette or betting. Like agon, these games usually involve competition; however, while games of agon are characterised by striving for self-improvement, alea involved a complete forfeiting of control. In alea games, players voluntarily give up their will and hand themselves over to chance, represented by symmetrical tools such as the coin or the dice. One key concept in the world of alea games is the concept of risk. As players increase the risks they are taking, the game becomes more intense. Entering the realm of pure chance is both unsettling and pleasurable. Games of alea mediate players a feeling of almost sacred trans. There is something calming about knowing that there is nothing I can do to influence the situation and that me and my opponents are all "naked" in the face of luck. But what exactly is luck? Every player has an implicit theory about this concept. Gamblers have been observed to behave in superstitious and almost religious ways, engaging in little rituals that are supposed to win luck over to their side (kissing the dice….). The realm of pure chance is so hard to make sense of that it often appears as its very opposite: fate, or the decision of some sort of mystical higher power. The philosophical experience of being ruled by luck is completely different

from the experience of predetermination. Dreyfus and Kelly (2011) argue that the idea of luck was a great invention of the Hellenistic era which eventually led to the emergence of Stoicism and, more controversially, modern nihilism. In any case, Stoicism and nihilism are amongst the topics that can be explored with people who engage in games of alea.

As an example, let me describe a game in the form of an absurd pilgrimage. In this game, participants embarked upon an afternoon-long pilgrimage, following instructions written in a handbook. These instructions contained randomly generated commands that frequently made use of chance, such as "when you encounter a crosspath, throw a coin" or "when you see a bird, head in the direction in which it is flying". The aim of the game was to eventually find a way back to the starting point. The game was designed to give participants a direct experience of what it is like to be explicitly at the mercy of chance, and feel the consequences. Some of them experienced frustration, but many of them quietly accepted their fate and enjoyed it. After the game, everyone was invited to join a collective contemplation on the topic of chance.

Games of alea make the random features of our life especially salient and can, amongst other things, mediate a rather peculiar nihilistic philosophical experience. This experience can have both positive and negative valence; Bataille (2008/1945), for instance, described "the will to chance" as a form of self-liberation. Games of chance can also be used by philosophy practitioners who wish to help people cultivate Stoic and other philosophical attitudes.

c) *Mimicry*

Caillois' category of *mimicry* encompasses all kinds of games that involve illusion and pretend play. When children play soldiers or parents, they engage in games of mimicry. Adults do this less often; however, modern improvisation games and especially LARPs represent prominent examples of mimicry games for adults (Strik 2014). In mimicry, one is invited to temporarily enter into a fictional world. This often means forfeiting one's usual identity and replacing it with another, made-up one. That is why the symbol of such games is a mask. A mask is what you use to conceal your true self in order to become someone else. More than any other type of game, mimicry engages the imagination, which is why it holds such a transformative potential. It invites people to re-imagine the reality they inhabit. As a result, they might expose some aspects of their lived

reality as illusionary and replace them with elements that they experienced in the game as more real. When a game of mimicry is over, people often wonder: "was that real?" Take emotions. While in character, one can experience profound emotions such as anger and attraction towards fellow characters. But are they real, given that such characters, strictly speaking, do not exist? LARPS make reality seem elusive, and potentially relative. They provide us with an opportunity to reflect upon the nature of the distinction between appearance and reality, which Rorty (2016) considers to be fundamental to the European philosophical tradition. In a LARP titled *Sinful People*, which my colleagues and I wrote specifically for the purpose of philosophical practice, our participants engaged in three chapters of a story set in a "sinful" town in decline. Every participant was assigned a role that they performed throughout the game. Between each chapter, there was a long break in which they stepped out of their role and engaged in collective planning of the next chapter.[8] In this way, the participants were simultaneously authors and players. The breaks also served us as opportunities for philosophical dialogues on the topic of appearance and reality. Some players were, for instance, struck by the fact that the game teased out new kinds of behaviour out of them. All of a sudden, they started behaving in ways which were egotistic, manipulative or cruel. Was this "just a game" or did these behaviours reflect something "real"?. Mimicry games have the potential to mediate experiences that undermine deeply ingrained assumptions about our reality. As a result, they can engage people in quintessentially metaphysical discussions. Philosophy practitioners who wish to incorporate them in their practice should be warned not to do so hastily and, ideally, at the assistance of a mental health professional.

d) *Illinx*

Caillois reserves the category of *illinx* for games that have the potential to cause vertigo to the players. In children's world, they are represented by tag (in which a blindfolded player chases others) or rolling down the hill. Adult forms of illinx games include various dancing rituals or adrenalin sports such as bungee-jumping and skiing. Illinx games resemble mimicry in that they tend to shake our sense of reality; however, they usually do not involve identity switching. They tend to be embodied and often have a rather simple structure. Their aim is not to win but to make one's head spin in a pleasurable way.

When you experience vertigo, you often gain the ability to see familiar phenomena from a novel perspective. The usual structures of our experience collapse and new ones emerge. Let us consider a popular improvisation game known as *The Wrong Name*.[9] In this game, participants walk around the room, pointing at objects and exclaiming words. The catch is that the words must not match the real names of the objects. For example, when pointing at a cup, you may exclaim: "Shoe!" This is surprisingly difficult. If you engage in this game long enough, your sense of reality begins to wear down and our words start feeling more and more absurd. I have used this game to make my participants reflect on the topic of the arbitrariness of language, famously described by Saussure. The game poses an opportunity to reflect on what it means to be a language animal and perceive the world through linguistic signs. Illinx games tend towards simplicity but can be very effective in prompting philosophical reflections. They have the ability to make the ordinary seem extraordinary, which is what can make one feel the famous sense of wonder described by Plato as the origin of philosophy.

Concluding thoughts

Let me conclude with a few thoughts on the playful nature of philosophy. I recently engaged in a philosophical conversation with a friend in which we elaborated on some ideas on the meaning of life. Another friend approached us and, looking bewildered, asked us: do you actually believe what you are saying or is this just an intellectual exercise for you? The question surprised me. Of course, the answer was *neither*. To me, our thoughts were much more than just an intellectual exercise; they felt meaningful. At the same time, I could not say that I truly *believed* the expressed propositions in any strong sense. It would have been much more accurate to say that we were simply exploring.

I think philosophising shares this explorative nature with play. Just like the claims made in the conversation with my friend, play is neither fully serious nor simply idle. It is an activity which allows us to safely explore options that our usual life does not. This is why both philosophy and play disclose features of the world to us. This isomorphism might explain why play and philosophical practice are such natural partners. Play can involve a broad range of mental and bodily activities, and the

experiences acquired through such activities can be translated into intellectual insights. One intriguing question for future research is what other parallels there are between philosophising and playing. Could it be the case, for instance, that philosophising can take different forms somewhat similar to the four categories of play identified by Caillois? Do some philosophical thoughts have a rather illinx or a rather agon nature?

References

Almeida, A. (2023). *Experiential-Practice Model of Philosophical Practice* (conference presentation). Paper presented at 17th International Conference on Philosophical Practice in Timisoara.

Altorf, H. M. (2016). Dialogue and discussion: Reflections on a Socratic method. *Arts and Humanities in Higher Education*, 18(1), 60-75.

Amir. L. (2018). *Taking Philosophy Seriously*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Barrientos-Rastrojo, J. (2015). Experiential Philosophical Practice. In: Fatić, S. & Amir, L., *Practicing Philosophy*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Bataille, Georges (2008/1945). On Nietzsche. Continuum Books.

Bøyum, S. (2008). The concept of philosophical experience. *Metaphilosophy* 39 (3):265–281

Brenifier, O. (2009). To Philosophise is to Cease Living. Available online.

Caillois, R. (1961). *Man, Play, and Game*s. Free Press of Glencoe.

Cavell, S. (1999). *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy.* Oxford University Press.

Csepregi, G. (2022). *Attitudes of Play*. McGill-Queen's University Press.

Dreyfus, H. & Kelly, S. D. (2011). *All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age*. Free Press.

Fink, E. (2010/1957). Oasis of Happiness: Thoughts toward an Ontology of Play. In. Fink, E., Play as a Symbol of the World and Other Writings. Indiana University Press.

Fink, E. (2010/1960). Play as a Symbol of the World. In. Fink, E., Play as a Symbol of the World and Other Writings. Indiana University Press.

Gendler, T. (2008). Alief and Belief. *Journal of Philosophy* 105 (10): 634-663.

Ginev, D., Coxon, I., Huici, V., Cegerén, A. D., Coca, J. R., Gómez-Redondo, S. (2020). *Approaches to the concept of Trans-Subjectivity*. CEASGA-Publishing.

Hadot, P. (2004). *What Is Ancient Philosophy?* Harvard University Press.

Hansen-Helskog, G. (2019). *Philosophising the Dialogos Way towards Wisdom in Education: Between Critical Thinking and Spiritual Contemplation*. London: Routledge.

Lahav, R. (2021). *What Is Deep Philosophy?* Vermont: Loyev Books.

Rorty, R. (2016). Getting Rid of the Appearance-Reality Distinction. *New Literary History*, vol. 47 no. 1, pp. 67-81.

Sokolowski, R. (1999). *Introduction to Phenomenology*. Cambridge University Press.

Stace, W. T. (1960). *Mysticism and Philosophy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Strik, O. (2014). Nordic LARP by Jaakko Stenros & Markus Montola (book review). *First Person Scholar*. Available online.