

Philosophical practice with corporal actions

David Sumiacher¹

Abstract: The paper provide some elements and perspectives regarding how it's possible to carry out philosophical practices through corporal actions. To understand this and to be able to do it out first, we must understand some general assumptions and principles around a broad understanding of philosophy and philosophical practice. After laying these foundations, I will focus on three great ways of performing corporal actions as part of the work that is done in philosophical practice. The first has to do with the sensory uptake of the other. In this way we enormously enrich the flow of elements that we use for working with others and the development of working hypotheses. A second type of corporal actions that we can incorporate into philosophical practice has to do with the performance of bodily actions by the practical philosopher. In this case, we use our action, gestures and expressions as a way of promoting, deepening and intensifying philosophical processes that are developed through dialogue or in any way. Lastly, a third way of including corporal actions in intersubjective philosophical interactions has to do with requesting the performance of specific corporal actions from others or performing them in conjunction with them. The variety of possibilities and achievable routes in this case is immense, but here we have an indisputable potential for philosophical work with others, which is built in principle from the grasp of circumstance and the philosophical process that is developing. In each case I will be considering a broad vision of philosophical practice that includes the work of philosophical counseling, philosophy for/with

¹ Educational Center for Autonomous Creation in Philosophical Practices - CECAPFI Mexico, Argentina, Italy, Colombia / UNAM; Email: david.sumiacher@cecapfi.com

children, philosophical workshops and applied philosophy in organizations.

Key-words: philosophical practice, corporal actions, philosophical counseling, Philosophy for Children, actions, philosophy with children, philosophical workshops, philosophy in organizations

To begin with these ideas, I have to refer to some epistemological elements in a somewhat general way. Philosophy is often thought to be defined by thinking, using language, making good questions or developing our "critical thinking." Certainly all these things can undoubtedly be part of philosophy, they touch various areas of what it is or can be philosophy but they do not cover, none of them, what philosophy is. I dare to make such strong statements from the beginning because I am sure that no one (or almost no one) wants a philosophical task that takes refuge only within the framework of "thinking". We are all interested in ideas when they are linked to the world we live in. Although the questions may be extremely important and much of philosophy and philosophical practice thrives on them, they only generate thought at first. A question can certainly move me to act, but only if I decode it first, analyze it, and then take a decision. Only thereafter is a question related to an action. The action is a different thing from the question, later but not implied in the first. I mean, the question is of utmost value, but without so much difficulty we could imagine circumstances where the important thing -is to act-, not to ask ourselves and precisely that action or reaction different from the question could be the most transcendent and philosophical thing that could be done. In the words of the great pedagogue Paulo Freire: "I must use all the possibilities within my reach, not only to talk about my utopia, but to participate in practices consistent with it" (Freire, 2012: 39).

Finally, no one would believe a "theorist" of justice who is not fair in his actions to a theorist of friendship who cannot have any friend. Which of these characters are the one that interests us? Although the importance of the theory is undeniable, evidently its only value is given thanks to the possibility that we have to link ourselves with "the things to which the theory refers". Talking about justice or friendship makes sense thanks to the vast group of fair or friendly actions that exist or could exist. With

language and critical thinking it is quite a similar question. Their existence is useless to me without the subjects activating and transforming his way of life. Why talk or think about the "confinement", "coherence", "harmony", "violence", "hospitality", "the Event", etc. if these are not or couldn't be in the world?². If this were so, philosophy could simply speak on "any subject" and would then have no social interest.

But philosophy is born, and not only that, it is carried out together in the world of our corporal actions as well as all the living processuality that we are. It goes through our lives as procedural coherence, as interconnection currents, as courses of existence that are related to the meaning that we can give and live in our human becoming. Philosophy happens, happens -within the game-³, not just in our minds. Thus, it can be said that philosophy exists or is present in different areas of our life, and the most logical thing is that it is more in some areas than in others. Sometimes we find ourselves with philosophical levels almost close to zero, other times philosophy bursts forth with great vigor into our life and our environment. But even if it seems that something that someone does is not at all philosophical, it is necessary to see with a little more care to note that all the acts that we carry out possess, even if only a minimal degree of philosophy, at least in a "germinal" form⁴. This is important for philosophical counseling or philosophical practice in general, since we work with all kinds of people and situations. It is also true that an act always has a philosophical dimension in a germinal way does not mean that the person, group or society in question wishes or finally manages to manifest that philosophical possibility. That depends on many factors and one of the main ones is the will and determination of our guests in philosophical practice. Philosophy is not an a priori in the facts, it is always an a priori as a possibility.

The point is that this great focus or interest that philosophy has had in thought and language processes, has also dragged philosophical practice

² This is what the Mexican logician Raymundo Morado referred to when he stated that logic is a science but at the same time an art, and it's an art because we must also apply it in everyday life. (This in relation to the video recently published by the Mexican Academy of Logic: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wrMuY-9WM> (accessed March 25, 2020).

³ Husserl, in this same sense, proposed a re-consideration of the *doxa* for the *episteme* (Husserl, 1991: 164), Merleau-Ponty said that philosophy was not the reflection of a previous truth but the "*realization of a truth*" (Merleau-Ponty, 1994: 20).

⁴ Obviously, I cannot delve into these ideas here. If you want to go deeper, I invite to consult the text "Philosophy as an expansion of life and processes" (Sumiacher, 2020).

into a similar trend. Corporal actions have been almost forgotten in philosophical practice and sometimes even in the very life of philosophers. But corporal actions have a great and irreplaceable potential. From this perspective, an action is a link with exteriority (Sumiacher, in Amir, 2017). These, in turn, can be active or receptive. Active when they infringe, transform, affect the environment and receptive when, using the senses, they perceive the world. At the same time, in addition to corporal actions, there are discursive actions, about which much has been analyzed, for example, a favorite representative in the treatment of this is John Austin⁵. This type of action is basically made up of saying and listening according to whether it is active or receptive. But beyond corporal and discursive actions, there is no other type of action that exists within the possibilities of the human as we know him today. Since discursive actions have already been talked about a lot, are well known and are also widely used within the field of philosophy and philosophical practice, let's dedicate ourselves to thinking about what happens and how we can use the great potential of corporal actions for this task. Let's delve into thinking how corporal actions can benefit or enrich the work of philosophical counseling, philosophical workshops, philosophy for/with children or philosophy in organizations.

The first level that I am going to present here consists of observing or perceiving our interlocutor(s) and the acts they carry out, to make use of these perceptions within the process of philosophical practice. Sensitivity to expressions of the subjectivity of the other is, in general, one of the most important capacities of those who dedicate themselves to doing this type of work. Within it, is the capture of gestures or movements, that is, bodily actions carried out by our consultant, group or people of the organization with which we are working. By training this sensitivity, and managing to capture these actions as part of the significant processuality in the other, I can then do different things. Not always once you observe an interesting attitude or action, it will be time to state something about it, sometimes it is just a matter of retaining it to express it later, connected with other elements that can give more argumentative force to the circumstance or to the philosophical process in which we are working. But

⁵ One of his classic texts on the subject is *How to do things with words* (Austin, 1982). Also in general can be investigated the full range of contemporary theories of informal logic, argumentation theory or critical thinking.

if they have significance, sooner or later, those observed elements have to be used by the consultant or practical philosopher, even more if they are repeated and linked to something similar to what Ran Lahav calls "patterns"⁶.

However, this is the first level of approach with corporal actions in philosophical practice, it is the level where the practical philosopher observes the bodily actions of the other and uses them, thinks about them and connects with the hypothesis-building process; or returns them - questioning what the other does-: "Why when I was saying what I said did the shape of your gaze change?", "Why did you raise/tremble your voice?", "Why did your arms started to move more broadly when you expressed that point to me?". My perspective does not adhere to the idea of "non-verbal language". For me, language is always a compound process, that is, a combined activity where there is one thing that refers to something else. All language is an action (expression, enunciation or written word) that refers to a thought as movement towards itself. All language is action or memory of actions (pronunciation, movement of the hand or memories of those sounds, images that oneself or others have made), but this is always done with the intention of provoking a thought as a movement towards itself, this it is always its purpose. This is complex and cannot be explained extensively in this space.

There is a natural or organic language, where actions have some kind of logical-organic link with what they refer to (such as when a dog shows teeth and "pretends" to be "understood" that it has to bite you if approached him, this is organic language because the dog exhibits the same elements that it would use to bite to make that understand to the other, even if it is not biting yet or maybe it never bites). This is the organic language, where there are two elements (showing and feeling/thinking that the other performs when seeing or perceiving what is shown) and there is also the language created by human beings that is the one that

⁶ See Chapter 4 *Stepping out of Plato's Cave: Philosophical Practice and Self-Transformation* (Lahav, 2016). It is complex in this space to make a comparison between the ideas of this interesting Israeli thinker and this proposal. In short, the patterns of Lahav are not -only- the parameter to take into account or not a corporal action regarding a philosophical process. There are a series of creative philosophical processes that do not have to do directly with patterns, because they do not reflect a dimension of limit or restriction for the subject and yet they report great significance.

operates by means of signs arbitrary⁷. However, the examples I gave before of the person moving his arms or raising his voice are not in themselves cases of "non-verbal language" or "organic language" in my own terms, because they are not necessarily made with the intention to imply something. They are only made, and they mean to the extent that everything we do means. Not everything is "language" if we understand that language is something that seeks to generate something else. The 20th Century has become so enthusiastic about language that it has hypothesized all kinds of rather curious ideas about it⁸. In this case, the movements that accompany the words of the person that is with us, are only the expression of the emotions and feelings that these verbal expressions, when stated, generate in the speaker and I can perceive them because they possibly have a certain force or magnitude that allows me to see them, to become external.

The verbal expressions of the speaker have a set of emotions (intuitive thoughts) that can be captured by the consultant or practical philosopher of certain expertise. Therefore, what is at stake here is the use on our part, of receptive-type bodily actions (perception) to capture the intuitions of the other, the emotional aspects that are movements towards oneself, but that have great significance in everything that is happening. This is the first use of bodily actions that I want to highlight in this text, that the philosopher perceives the other and takes advantage of that perception. The contents of perceptions are useful because they are not present in the discursive contents that the other states, they could be irreplaceable keys to the development of a course of philosophical meaning that could otherwise be escaped by missing out on great opportunities. It is not enough for the practical philosopher to listen, he must also hear, see, smell and feel, finally feeling is possibly a highly complex and refined extension of -touching- ourselves as Antonio Damasio

⁷ The concept of arbitrariness introduced by Saussure in the field of linguistics in the 20th Century, is one of the most important discoveries to understand language. About this much could be said... This is not a text dedicated to language, but I am forced to mention some minimum aspects in order to move forward.

⁸ I could call everything "language" just as I can give any name to what we "do in general", but that does not mean that everything we do is the same or operates in the same way. Calling "nonverbal language" to the facial or corporal expressions can be quite troubling because it could imply that they have hidden meanings or, worse yet, be completely confused about understanding the things in front of us.

insinuates⁹. The perception of the other is a first level then very important for the development of any philosophical practice, although this possibly also applies to all kinds of disciplines that involve working with others such as psychology, education, sociology, human resources, etc. This type of skill must be trained and studied as much as our analytical and critical capacity for listening.

We have spoken of a first level, the consultant or practical philosopher perceives. A second level is that the consultant or practical philosopher actively act, intervene in the world. The transition from receptive to active (from perceiving to doing) is usually not so easy. This is because the active implies the receptive and not the other way around, the active is a more complex and elaborate process. For example, I cannot insert a needle into the needle holder (which normally has holes for it), if I don't see where the hole is, how the needle holder is positioned, where the needle is, etc. I can see the needle holder and the needle without the need to perform any active corporal action, but there is no way I can place the needle without perceiving what I am doing (apart than doing it). Always the active corporal action requires more processuality. If I anesthetized my arm and my hand (so I wouldn't feel the movement I'm making) and if I also blindfolded myself, I would have no way of knowing whether or not my hand is putting the needle in the right place. Active corporal action requires self-perception of action, this is a basic principle of corporal action. Therefore, active corporal action is always more complex and more difficult to carry out both for the practical consultant or philosopher and for the counselee, individual, group or organization with which one is working.

But let's see what kind of active corporal actions we can take for our philosophical role. Here I am referring to all kinds of body gestures, actions linked to environment, faces or expressions. How it works is interesting because in this case I am doing certain things because they are perceived. It is possible that I actually possess the feelings that give or would give rise to such movements of my face, hands, gaze, gestures, etc. But in these cases, I purposely exacerbate them due to the effect they generate. I cannot see my faces directly because I am not normally in front of a mirror, but I have the perception and memory of my muscles from other times that I have

⁹ Something similar to when he says "the brain is the captive audience of the body" (Damasio, 2000: 171).

moved them that way. I also observe the reactions that these generate in the others. So the perception of my faces or gestures is indirect, but I can give them a course and this allows me to keep them and give them nuances. Couldn't this be thought of as manipulation? No way. All I do in philosophical practice is a ping pong of reactions and interactions. Are the questions of a Lipmanian, Nelsonian, Breniferian, or Lahavian philosopher innocent? Of course not. All of them are done with the intention of generating an effect. Not to make the other think as I think or do what I want him to do, but to move the other from his "self-blamed minority age" as Kant called it; to remove the other from the comfort of crystallized, closed or routine thinking. Was Socrates "authentic" in all his reactions and interlocutions? It's difficult to say that Socrates did not know about the effect of his exacerbated amazement that sometimes ended in extremely cynical airs. Thus, Pierre Hadot attributes to him the ability to "pretend to fall in love", which is related to this apparently "innocent" approach to things, which allowed him and his interlocutors to realize everything that was ignored in relation to life or the concepts that they were investigating¹⁰. Emphasizing certain gestures or exaggerating certain corporal actions insofar as they are perceived by the other and not only "because they sit", this also refers to the art of philosophical practice¹¹.

Many times all I do is increase a little the feeling that naturally a circumstance within the philosophical practice generates for me and I use the same "fibers" of what happens to myself to produce that reaction. This can happen, for example, if I increase a little the amazement that I show or the discomfort that a certain contradiction can cause me. Actually, doing this kind of thing requires deep self-knowledge because it is about strategically using our own tendencies¹². This type of "voluntarily

¹⁰ This is how the French author explains it: *"Socrates ironic love consists of pretending to have fallen in love. In dialectical irony Socrates acted in a similar way, asking his questions, trying to get his interlocutor to communicate his knowledge or wisdom. But in fact, what the interlocutor discovered in this game of questions and answers was his inability to put some remedy to the ignorance of Socrates..."* (Hadot, 2006: 95).

¹¹ This is what the philosopher Ariel Campirán, one of the most outstanding logicians in Mexico, refers to when he says that: *"Modeling is a strategy that consists of 'making others see' through various actions inspired by the mirror, a parade of fashions, or just on the sideboard. The instructor or someone in the group models, when he acts (imitates, overreacts, exaggerates, repeats several times, irony, etc.) to make something noticeable"* (Campiran, s/f: 31).

¹² The same is proposed, for example, by my Australian colleague Narelle Arcidiacono, in what she calls "dramatic philosophy", an extremely interesting proposal inspired by

exaggerated" reaction could be very useful for the people with whom we are working and help them delve into certain points of great importance thanks to this performative reaction. Other times, I must go even further and bring from within me some reaction that perhaps is not so natural for me to present at that moment. For example, sometimes when working with teenagers, and this is an example that I often cite, young people do not want to be given "such close attention". If one is excessively interested in knowing about them and "understanding" them, this generates rejection and distance because, due to their age, they mainly want to be accepted without too much analysis. However, philosophical work often requires a careful analysis of what is said or done, therefore one must assume a position of a certain "disinterest", although this is not our most spontaneous attitude. This little "forcing" of oneself, allows the others to open up in a spontaneous and much more natural way, improves the bonds and finally allows us to possibly reach extremely different results.

In general, this second use of bodily actions refers to understand them as provocations or interpellations¹³ towards the other. But these possibilities are not only a simulation or a forcing of ourselves. If we did so, surely our interlocutors would catch this falsehood or self-imposition and we would have a more damaging than beneficial result. The important thing is to be able to use our own resources to build an action so that, although it is generated to produce an effect, it is at the same time an authentic development. And this is so because it arises from the authentic desire that the other can deepen and know himself more. In Buddhism this is called "skillful means" where the Buddha is said to shape his teaching according to the disciple's abilities, time, and circumstance (Nichiren Daishonin, 2008) . Sometimes a great teacher seems to be furious but maybe he is not that way, sometimes he seems calm although thousands of storms erupt inside him. The so-called "wise men" of the different times and traditions undoubtedly used this form of bodily action consciously produced according to its effects, because they knew of its importance and great scope. Today the philosophical practice can and must certainly also be enriched with these kinds of possibilities.

Grotowsky's "organic theater" and in different aspects of philosophy for children and philosophical counseling (Arcidiacono, 2014).

¹³ Who makes use of this concept taken from Levinass for the field of philosophy for children is Professor José Ezcurdia (Ezcurdia, 2016).

The third type of use for corporal actions within the philosophical practice that I want to highlight, has to do with requesting our counselee, guest, group or organization with which we are working, to carry out corporal actions by himself. This also includes taking actions together with them. The actions that the other could do can be perceptions or interventions (corporal actions of an active nature); but in this case the practical philosopher has designed or designs in the course of work a proposal for the other to do things that go beyond analysis or discourse, although of course they can be combined with them. In ancient Mexico, in the philosophical schools of the Mexicas (called Calmecac or Tepochcalli), the tlamatimines (sages or philosophers of this tradition), permanently used this type of exercise or practice:

In this way it is how the tlamatimine fulfilled their mission of "making wise the faces of others". And if we remember, what was said about the series of acts or external "customs" kept in the Calmécac, we will see that its inflexible rigidity, which could be described as hardness, was precisely aimed at giving strength to the dynamic aspect of the personality: to the heart. Through this series of disciplined acts and penances, the "human will" was formed, capable of controlling itself. It seems, then, that what the tlamatimine were looking for with their education in the Calmécac was to perfect the personality of their disciples in their two fundamental aspects: giving wisdom to faces and firmness to hearts (Leon Portilla, 1993).

This was also the case in various Hellenistic schools such as the Stoic school or the Garden of Epicurus. Those who entered there underwent an arduous discipline of life that involved doing all kinds of activities and certain very special types of coordination or coherence in the course of their actions. Our colleagues of that time, without a doubt, glimpsed the importance and irreplaceable effect of carrying out corporal actions for the development of a philosophical process.

Obviously, the variety of corporal actions that we could request or propose to our visitor or group in a session of philosophical practices could be of the widest variety. An interesting type of job has to do with asking for perceptions, asking the other to look, touch, smell, hear or taste. This could

be done with specific objects that we select at the moment depending on what is happening or on something we have prepared for the session. For several years I have been doing philosophical consultancies using objects and it is quite interesting for the creative possibilities that arise from analogical thinking and manipulation. Of course, here it's a combination of corporal actions of an active and receptive nature. It is also very interesting to create perceptual connections with various contexts that foster interesting trends in the process. These contexts can be close to the space where we are working or they can be previously arranged with the individual or group for the generation of a certain type of work. The mere fact of dialogue in a different place can make a big difference due to the perception that operates simultaneously with a dialogue or reasoning. Of course, we can also actively request -do- all sorts of things as part of session work. This can be done by requesting that the other do things in front of us during the session (whether we have prepared such requests or not) or through philosophical tasks that complement the work that is done in the meetings. I will give some examples of this later. Also we can actively perform corporal actions together with the other. This last possibility is extremely interesting.

Another useful classification to glimpse the myriad of possibilities in all of this is the distinction between creative and critical body actions (Sumiacher, 2016)¹⁴. There really is a very big difference between one and the other. I will try to explain it with an example: if we ask a person with whom we are working, to approach their relatives in an everyday situation, but that instead of doing all kinds of things to please them - as we suppose he usually does-, just keep still and focused on his individual development. Here, we have a clear example of a critical corporal action that we could introduce in a philosophical counseling work to deal with the subject¹⁵, for example, of complacency with others. If, on the other hand, you were with

¹⁴ Here a very broad perspective of work is presented, not only considering body actions but all the different types of processes of philosophical practice in its critical or creative aspects.

¹⁵ Critical corporal actions are extremely important also in the field of philosophy with organizations, they can occupy a vital place, since organizations have usually areas where operate rules and objectives, as well as they are generally linked to the "world of work". I cannot enter here in depth into the systemic characteristics of the critical as I have been studying it, but the work, the goals, the "duty", earning a living, etc. These are all aspects that are linked to critics. Also of course you can do a lot of creative things in an organization, here I am only talking about a certain trend.

a group of people, addressing this same topic (complacency to others), but you wanted to work with it through creative bodily actions, you would do something else. You could invite them to play a game with one goal to accomplish -suppose, solve a puzzle game- but we should solve it in different ways. First very focused on ourselves, secondly supporting each other, thirdly exaggerating this support to each other. After making these games we would analyze and delve into different points, being able to continue with other games that continue working on this same axis or doing other kinds of things, depending on the session.

In any of the two cases (the exercise with the family and the game with the group) I am not "looking to show how it's that one lives or should live the aspect of complacency with others". Philosophical practice does not operate like some somewhat superficial versions of coaching, which seek to literally show a certain pre-defined route with a corporal action. For us, corporal actions are experiments, they fulfill the same function as a question only that they operate multidimensionally. When a question is asked in philosophical practice, we do not know the answer or it does not matter as much - what we do know-. We listen to the other's response and from there we build with that material. Now it's exactly the same, we do not always invite the performance of a certain bodily action because it "shows what must be done". Sometimes, on the contrary, we do it because of its problematizing nature. I have called this problematization with bodily actions and it is extremely interesting in the field of philosophy with or for children or in all kinds of philosophical practices due to its provocative and revealing meanings.

Above all, it is our ability to design these proposals, which is a capacity analogous to designing good questions¹⁶. The corporal actions

¹⁶ For all this, it is essential to realize who we are working with and constantly ask ourselves about people before and during the process. This allows us to recognize what kind of activity others are willing to do. There are people who love games, others with whom, even for the very context of work, we can only do exercises. Sometimes it's interesting to work with objects, sometimes radically change the context. Occasionally our actions have to be extremely challenging and disruptive, other times they hardly go beyond what is normally done. It is also important to capture the vision of the things that the people with whom we are working have to define the course of activities to do or propose. For the work of philosophy practice in the health sector, for example, understanding or delving into what is the underlying concept in the work context is equally fundamental to know what kind of disposition to take and of exercises or corporal actions to suggest. It is interesting to see the book *Come in cielo così in terra* (Arrigoni and Nave, 2013).

that we invite to carry out are processing devices that are linked to the existing procedurality within the person or persons with whom we work. If the practical philosopher is someone prepared to grasp those kinds of process magnitudes, then he can easily imagine what kind of active corporal action to propose. We can, sometimes, and with some practice, design them during the session itself, and after a few minutes of listening and seeing the other, propose them directly, as well as a good coordinator of philosophical workshops of any kind can improvise questions. But we can also plan them and of course the sessions in philosophical practice must be planned. Sometimes, due to some hypostation of the idea of mayeutics, some people think that nothing can be planned or prepared, but this is only a rather idealistic view of the matter. The fact that there is planning does not imply, of course, total addressing. Planning is not the subject of this text, but in many occasions there is a kind of “taboo” with addressing, when good philosophical practice, or good dialogue, is always a meeting of directions that already exist and not the absence of they. In any case, it can always happen that, based on the circumstance, what we have planned must be completely changed. But that does not mean that planning has been in vain, hence the famous phrase by Gilles Deleuze that says that philosophy is ultimately only a long preparation. Planning also means caring, it means thinking about the other before being there, spending time to the others and giving importance to what we do. In many occasions, without dedicating excessive amounts of time, we can design very fruitful and interesting proposals for corporal actions that end up generating unusual significance.

In all this, our empathic-projective grasp is fundamental, it is the same capacity that allows us to realize whether or not a question will be out of place in a dialogue. It is also important our ability to understand what we are proposing, our eloquence, passion and the trust that we can establish with that or those persons with whom we are working. All this favors getting them to do things that they have never even done before. When they are actions of this type, it is highly recommended that the practical philosopher carry out these actions together with people, to remove the fear and modesty that action often generates. This is a very interesting way of working with corporal actions within philosophical

practice¹⁷. It is like accompanying someone to see the sunrise, as when the Zen master meditates with his disciples or as when those who lived in the Garden of Epicurus ate in community. It is about empathizing with the feelings and the “attunement” of the circumstance together with people, living the experience together with others¹⁸.

In closing, I want to emphasize the fact that just as the thoughts or words detached of the world are empty and devoid of philosophical impact; in the same way, corporal actions that do not have a framework for reflection or dialogue are equally hollow and superficial. The relationships that we must draw between thought and action must be nurtured throughout the entire process of philosophical practice. For this we can intersperse moments of some things and others. After performing any type of corporal action, we have to ask openly about the experience, so that people can freely express to us what they feel and think and put into words the acts and processes that they previously lived through. Subsequently, I can go into greater precision and depth through dialogue, it all depends on the type of session and process I am working with and why do i do it¹⁹. Also, of course, I can create areas for reflection during the action itself, investigating or speaking about interesting or pertinent points for the process.

¹⁷ Some clear examples of where this happens is when doing a philosophical activity in a museum or in a historical place, for example, but not only in these contexts. Philosophical walks can be used as a means to experience together with people a renewed perception of what the places where they live or work on a daily basis mean. It's interesting and fruitful to work the philosophical walks from the vision of the corporal actions. In a philosophical workshop with inmates or street children, for example, it could be extremely important to carry out manual tasks, produce objects to sell, etc. together with them, as part of the work of the sessions. The -accompanying- people to do things that have a deep meaning that is linked with the philosophical senses that are being built, can have a highly transcendent meaning and completely transform the subsequent dialogues and environments.

¹⁸ Another author and colleague who has been working on this type of approach for a long time is the Spanish José Barrientos, who approaches it from the concept of experientiality (Barrientos, 2013 and 2016).

¹⁹ It can also be the case of certain works with corporal actions within philosophical practice, for which one has to wait a certain time to give rise to the moment of consciousness, dialogue, analysis, etc. It could be that the processes that are developing are extremely important, but the person does not yet have the ability to see or realize it. This should be identified on the basis of signs that demonstrate this difficulty and then treated with great care. It will be noticed how the consideration of the corporal actions within the philosophical practice opens a huge range of possibilities and deeply enriches our "tool box".

Generally extremes are not favorable. For people very prone to action, thinking will be better, for people who are too thinkers, we must create valuable disruptions in the form of corporal actions within the process. Neither of the two elements is not waivable either. Just as we cannot learn to ride a bicycle by reading a book, or reading a book without taking the object where the letters and words are and see it; no human being can renounce or do anything, detaching himself from acts and processes towards himself or those linked to exteriority. To be able to work with all this, the practical philosopher must dispose himself completely, sparing no possibility, using all his actions and resources in order to deepen the philosophical task. Only this type of attitude of total dedication allows us to approach such a wide field of work and reach levels of interaction of philosophical value. Is this easy to do? Possibly not. Surely it must require a great disposition and work with oneself on the part of the practical philosopher.

This really is an added value, since it assures us that we are not falling into a merely mechanical or superficial work. Philosophical practice is a bet for philosophy to be part of this society and for this reason, practical philosophers must prepare ourselves deeply to carry out such a worthy task. The good thing, finally, is that the difficulties we encounter will give testimony that what we can get it really worth it.

Note: This paper was published in Italian language by *Rivista Italiana di Counseling Filosofico* of PRAGMA, Italy, No. 13, 2020.

References

- Amir, L. (Comp.) (2017). *New Frontiers of Philosophical Practice: Expanding Boundaries*, UK: Cambridge.
- Arcidiacono, N. (2014). *Dramatic Philosophy: Imagine a World. Space, Silent Dialogue Sensibility and Serenity*, Brisbane: Narelle Arcidiacono.
- Arrigoni, F. and Nave, L. (2013). *Come in cielo così in terra*, Milano: Edizioni Unicópoli.
- Austin, J. (1982). *Cómo hacer cosas con palabras*, España: Ediciones Paidós.
- Barrientos, J. (2013). *Filosofía y espacios sociales*, España: Visión Libros.

- Barrientos, J. (2016). "La experiencialidad como respuesta a la tendencia analítica de la filosofía para niños" en *childhood & philosophy*, rio de janeiro, v. 12, n. 25, set.-dez. 2016, pp. 519-542 issn 1984-5987.
- Campirán A. (s/f). *Habilidades de pensamiento crítico y creativo*, Xalapa: Universidad Veracruzana.
- Damasio, A. (2000). *Sentir lo que sucede*, Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello.
- Ezcurdia, J. (2016). *Filosofía para niños, la filosofía frente al espejo*, México: UNAM/Ítaca.
- Freire, P. (2012). *Pedagogía de la indignación. Cartas pedagógicas en un mundo revuelto*, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Hadot, P. (2006). *Ejercicios espirituales y filosofía antigua*, España: Siruela.
- Husserl, E. (1991). *La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental*, Barcelona: Crítica.
- Lahav, R. (2016). *Stepping out of Plato's Cave: Philosophical Practice and Self-Transformation*, Vermont: Loyev books.
- León-Portilla, M. (1993). *Filosofía náhuatl*, México: UNAM.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1994). *Fenomenología de la percepción*, España: Planeta.
- Nichiren Daishonin (2008). *Los escritos de Nichiren Daishonin*, Alemania: FGB.
- Sumiacher, D. (2016). "Critical and Creative Philosophical Practices" in *Journal of Humanities Therapy*, Chunchon, Vol. 7, No. 1.
- Sumiacher, D. (Comp.) (2020). *Prácticas filosóficas comparadas. Filosofía con/para niños, consultoría filosófica, talleres filosóficos*, Buenos Aires: Novedades Educativas/Editorial CECAPFI.