

Experiential Philosophical Practice

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About the book: *Filosofía Aplicada Experiencial.*
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This book came from a disturbing experience: meeting a young man who was dying at the feet of the author in the Hidalgo subway (Mexico City), someone just as invisible to others as hidden from himself. The lines of this work was born out of the anxiety of an author who, afterwards, got tired of "being someone" and being faithful to "a philosophy that had become a simple posture" (p. 14). His chapters are written out of the confusion that arises when confronting lectures about the quaternity of Heideggerian being or the importance of the last logical thesis on the incompatibility of assumptions (speeches heard from soft armchairs and delivered from power centers), for violating the canons imposed by "pure, clean and silent." In those moments, one perceives the distance between the critical desideratum of thought and the suffering reality of those who suffer and those who need that box of philosophical tools that Foucault pointed out.

This text aims to expand the circle of theoretical-practical philosophy, as Peter Singer said, to incarnate in communicative dialogue (Habermas) and solidarity (Rorty).

Philosophical Practice questions the position ("posture") of those who exercise negative criticism and hide when it is necessary to engage in the public market. He does this by listening, although he does not forget that the result must be dialogue, and therefore it is necessary to speak and theorize, although not to the point of turning the other into a footnote or final questions that do not allow the reader to be questioned. In addition, Philosophical Practice requires a deep knowledge of history and philosophical concepts, although not to speak

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from the throne of knowledge, but to help others improve their thinking skills. This is done by asking for the word of those traditionally despised by philosophers.

Following the Experiential Philosophical Practice is developed through three blocks of content. The first stops at explaining the applied dimension of the discipline. It explains how Philosophy for Children was an excellent project for children and young people to improve their critical and creative abilities and, secondly, to respect and care for others. The training capacity of the discipline increases if we look at the history of philosophy to discover how, in addition to analytical thinking, it is possible to understand the body in a workshop that takes the *Phenomenology of Perception* by Merleau-Ponty, to delve into an eidos, or concept using Husserl's "eidetic variations", arousing criticism with Walter Benjamin's radio scripts or Theodor Adorno's proposal to organize sessions in which young students criticize the ideological framework of fashionable songs, strengthen the amazement with the walks proposed by Rachel Carlson in *The sense of wonder*, unfolding a phenomenological text avoiding a subjectivist interpretation that appeals to the works of Paul Ricoeur, "deciphering the original feeling" with the "abyss" of Maria Zambrano or helping young people in the suburbs to delve into communicative acts, i.e. beyond those interested, "strategically" or "goal-oriented" that Max Weber and Habermas explained to us. If these theories were articulated in workshops, would not the philosophical act and the content of philosophy be extended? Here is the revolution of this book: it doesn't explain not another method of Philosophical Practice, but it aims to deep into the applied dimensions of all philosophies because we are talking about *Philosophical Practice* and we understand Philosophy coming from Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Sartre, Nietzsche or Giorgio Agambem. Thus, the book encourages the reader to articulate his own method, rather than offer a specific model of philosophical advice or workshops. Its author is confident in increasing the age of their philosopher reader in order to be able to develop their own Philosophical Practice by means of real philosophers.

The second block descends to the experiential dimensions of Philosophical Practice. The logical, argumentative and conceptual reason is crucial for the study, analysis and deepening in questions of philosophical consultation or in the dialogues of the group sessions. However, cognitive dissonance, the fact that this reason does not always cause metamorphosis to the subject or simply the frustration of consultants who discover the correct theory to complete, but are not able to put it into practice, works as an important limitation for analytical reasons. For this reason, life experiences are used as a mechanism in which thinking and life are linked, i.e. discoveries generate in life experiences change thoughts and identity and provoke profound transformations in the person and groups.

The difference between logical-argumentative and experiential modes is explained in the following example. Maybe a young man does not want to

give up risky night races on a motorcycle, despite the *theoretical* arguments offered by his mother. However, the *experience* of the accident of one of his friends not only changes his ideas, but also the way he copes with life, his decisions, accession and disappointment. Where logical and conceptual reasons did not change the young man's life, the experience was successful. Experiential Philosophical Practice follows this path: proposing experiential exercises that help the consultant and the groups to go their own way.

The last block delves into the problem of the critical dimension of this discipline. Philosophical Practice must not forget the warnings of Foucault and all antipsychiatry against the danger of turning thought into an instrument for uncritically fulfilling the objectives of the system or an instrument of normalization. For this reason, a restless counselee will probably not find a sedative or medication to calm their anxiety during the session. On the contrary, the philosophical counselor can confront them with their pain, because, after all, there is the possibility of authenticity: in suffering, the possibility opens up of seeing us face to face. In this way, the areas of this Experiential Philosophical Practice are not calm, but preparation, pilgrimage and suicidal journey. These scenarios are not aggressively modeled in consultation or in groups, because what would be the point of grossly injuring a person with a minor injury, other than preventing them from returning or causing traumatic suffering without yielding returns? However, the session does not involve a caress job or a normalization that seeks the happiness or return of the person to their state of zombies that consume the system.

On the other hand, it is proposed as a requirement of the critical dimension of an Philosophical Practice that hurts the system of reification in its core: the economic structure or demand for payment for any work done and addressing as a service exclusively to the affluent classes. Thus, the critique of this discipline mocks the law imposed by capitalism and the hypotheses that move us without being aware of it. Thus, let us repeat, the greatest critique of the system and the greatest emancipatory act consists in proposing our philosophical task as free, on the one hand, and dedicated to the most invisible and despised in our society. The confusion and misunderstanding caused by this decision-making in the world is a sign that the critical goal is being achieved. Keep in mind that this does not involve free philosophical services always, as it is impossible to get out of physical and systemic needs, but rather to introduce a virus that not only questions the current ideology, but ends up immunizing (using Roberto Esposito's image) the philosophy from falling into the clutches of the strategic and goal-oriented system (in the sense explained by Weber and Habermas). In fact, the position installed in capitalist ideology appears as a position of one who proclaims his theories in the desert, not because there is no one to listen to, but because the philosopher is careful to avoid the crowd, because who knows what others think of their speech!